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David Clough 
Interpreting human life by looking the other way: Bonhoeffer on human 
beings and other animals 
1. Natural human uniqueness 
When confronted with the question of the hermeneutics of human life, one of the most ancient 
and most common responses has been to look the other way. Instead of focussing on human 
beings, philosophers and theologians have commonly looked at other animals in order to give 
an account of human life.1 Plato records a Socratic etymology of anthrōpos distinguishing 
between the other animals, who do not examine, or consider, or look up at any of the things 
they see: “of all the animals anthrōpos alone is rightly called anthrōpos, because he looks up at 
what he has seen”.2 For Socrates, as for many who followed him, this observed difference 
functions as an interpretative insight for understanding how human beings should live well: 
human beings are the only rational animals and human lives are lived at their best when they 
are lived rationally.3 Others have judged different differences to be significant for interpreting 
human life: both Plato and Xenophon considered religion as a uniquely human attribute;4 
elsewhere we find nakedness, laughter, promising, mourning, language, conscience, morality, 
clothing, tool use, immortality, freedom, violence, restraint from  
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violence or symbol-making posited as unique human capabilities.5 There are several kinds of 
questions to be asked of such attempts to interpret the phenomenon of the human through 
                                                
1
 I am grateful to Tom Greggs for comments on an earlier draft of this paper, as well as to participants in the 
colloquium for questions and comments. 
2
 Plato, Cratylus, 399c in Plato, Plato in Twelve Volumes, vol. 12, trans. Harold N. Fowler. Harvard University 
Press; William Heinemann Ltd: Cambridge, MA and London 1921, cited in: Robert Renehan, ‘The Greek 
Anthropocentric View of Man’, Harvard Studies in Classical Philology (85) 1981, 239–259, 247. 
3
 See, for example, Aristotle, The Ethics of Aristotle: The Nicomachean Ethics, ed. Hugh Tredennick, trans. J. A. 
K. Thompson. Penguin Revised edition: Harmondsworth, Middlesex 1976, 1.7, which specifies rationality as 
the function of human beings on the basis of it being their only unique characteristic. 
4
 Robert Renehan, ‘The Greek Anthropocentric View of Man’, in: Harvard Studies in Classical Philology (85) 
1981, 239–259, 250. 
5
 For one list, see Jacques Derrida and David Wills, ‘The Animal That Therefore I Am (More to Follow)’, in: 
Critical Inquiry (28:2) 2002, 369–418, 373. 
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differences with other animals. The first kind concerns their accuracy: Socrates is clearly 
wrong to deny that other animals examine, consider or look up at what they see, but recent 
studies in primates and other animals show we must reconsider other supposedly unique 
human characteristics too, such as rationality, language-use and morality.6 The second kind of 
question asks about the adequacy of the method of looking at human/non-human differences as 
a basis for a hermeneutic of human life: if we were able to locate a unique attribute of human 
beings — a median furrow in the upper lip is one possible candidate7 — why should that be 
considered any guide to interpreting how human life should be understood or conducted? In the 
light of the inaccuracy and dubious validity of such arguments, it seems more likely that 
presuppositions concerning what is most significant in human life are being pegged onto 
supposed human/non-human differences in order to give them authority. A third kind of 
question concerns the consequence of the deployment of the argument, both for the human 
beings to whom the characteristic is attributed, and for the non-human beings to whom the 
attribute is denied and who are therefore labelled irrational, stupid, immoral, slaves to instinct, 
and so on. 
There are strong reasons to suppose that the theological ethics of Dietrich Bonhoeffer 
should be immune from any such concerns about deducing morality from human/non-human 
differences. If Christian ethics supersedes all other ethical reflection and functions as the 
critique of all 
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ethics, in Bonhoeffer’s famous words,8 if we must set aside all previous understandings of 
nature in order to recover the concept of the natural from the Gospel itself,9 then it seems that 
he should be first to object to doing ethics by looking about the world and commenting on the 
differences between humans and other animals. It is strange, therefore, to find Bonhoeffer 
adopting this methodology on several occasions. In his Ethics there are three examples of using 
a human/non-human difference as the introduction to an ethical position. First, early in his 
section on bodily life, he writes “Unlike an animal shelter, a human dwelling is not intended to 
be only a protection against bad weather and the night, as well as a place to raise offspring. It is 
                                                
6 See, for example, Marc Bekoff, Minding Animals: Awareness, Emotions, and Heart. Oxford University Press: 
New York 2002; Marc Bekoff, Animal Passions and Beastly Virtues: Reflections on Redecorating Nature. 
Temple University Press: Philadelphia 2006; Frans de Waal, Good Natured: The Origins of Right and Wrong 
in Humans and Other Animals. Harvard University Press: Cambridge, MA 1996. 
7 This is a part of Charles Winick’s definition of ‘man’ in Charles Winick, The Dictionary of Anthropology. 
Philosophical Library: New York 1956, 339, cited in: H. Peter Steeves, ‘The Familiar Other and Feral Selves: 
Life At the Human/Animal Boundary’, in: The Animal-Human Boundary: Historical Perspectives, Angela N. 
H. Creager and William Chester Jordan (eds.). University of Rochester Press: Rochester, NY 2002, 228–264, 
232. 
8
 “The knowledge of good and evil appears to be the goal of all ethical reflection. The first task of Christian ethics 
is to supersede that knowledge. […] Christian ethics claims to articulate the origin of the whole ethical 
enterprise and thus to be considered an ethic only as the critique of all ethics.” Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Ethics. 
DBWE 6. Fortress: Minneapolis 2005, 299–300 (301). Page numbers in parentheses in this reference and those 
that follow are to the German edition of Bonhoeffer’s works: Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Dietrich Bonhoeffer Werke, 
ed. Eberhard Bethge. Chr. Kaiser Verlag: Munich 1986. 
9
 “ Thus, the concept of the natural must be recovered from the gospel itself. We speak of the natural as distinct 
from the sinful in order to include the created.” Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Ethics. DBWE 6, 173 (165). 
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the space in which human beings may enjoy the pleasures of personal life in the security of 
their loved ones and their possessions.”10 In the sentences that follow, Bonhoeffer identifies the 
joys of bodily life that go beyond mere necessities, in relation to eating and drinking, clothing, 
relaxation and sexuality. In doing so he seems to depend on the view that human beings are the 
only animals that experience joy. This opinion is easily invalidated by any dog owner, as well 
as by research studies,11 thus raising the accuracy question identified above. While Bonhoeffer 
grounds his affirmation of human joy in an account of the Christian significance of the body,12 
introducing this human/non-human difference seems intended as a support to his theological 
case. It is not clear, however, how in his scheme this argument  
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would work, thus raising questions of adequacy. Denying the possibility of joy to other animals 
would also have the consequence of reducing concern for this dimension of their well-being.13 
The second example from the Ethics of Bonhoeffer using the identification of 
difference between human beings and other animals in relation to an ethical argument is in the 
context of his discussion of suicide, where he makes the following observation: 
In contrast to animals, human beings have their lives not as an obligation that they cannot 
throw off, but in freedom to affirm or destroy them. Human beings can do what no animal 
can: they can voluntarily bring death on themselves. While animals are one with their 
bodily lives, human beings can distinguish themselves from their bodily lives. The freedom 
in which humans have their bodily life allows them freely to affirm this life and at the same 
time points them beyond bodily life; this freedom allows them to understand bodily life 
both as a gift to preserve and as a sacrifice to offer.14 
Here Bonhoeffer attributes to human beings the unique capacities of distinguishing themselves 
from their bodily lives, acting freely in relation to life and therefore being able to commit 
suicide. As regards accuracy, it is unclear as to whether Bonhoeffer is right that suicidal acts 
are uniquely human as similar self-destructive behaviour has been observed in many other 
species.15 The questions concerning whether freedom and the ability to dis- 
                                                
10 Ibid., 187 (181). 
11 For a review of relevant studies, see Franklin D. McMillan, ‘Do Animals Experience True Happiness?’, in: 
Mental Health and Well-Being in Animals, Franklin D. McMillan (ed.). Oxford: Blackwell 2005, 221–34 and 
Bernard E. Rollin, ‘Animal Happiness: A Philosophical View’, in Mental Health and Well-Being in Animals, 
Franklin D. McMillan (ed.). Oxford: Blackwell 2005. 235–241. 
12
 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Ethics. DBWE 6,186 (179f). 
13
 Considerable attention has been given to this issue in order to improve the welfare of non-human animals in 
captivity. In addition to the references given in note 10, see, for example James E. King, and Virginia I. Landau, 
‘Can Chimpanzee (Pan Troglodytes) Happiness be Estimated By Human Raters?’, in: Journal of Research in 
Personality (37:1) 2003, 1–15. 
14
 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Ethics. DBWE 6, 196f (192). 
15
 See Antonio Preti, ‘Suicide Among Animals: A Review of Evidence’, in: Psychological Reports (101) 2007, 
831–848; J. N. Crawley, M. E. Sutton, and D. Pickar, ‘Animal Models of Self-Destructive Behavior and 
Suicide’, Psychiatric Clinics of North America 8:2 (1985), 299-310. It is certain, however, despite many 
stories and even a faked 1958 Disney nature film, that lemmings do not exhibit this behaviour: see Dennis 
Chitty, Do Lemmings Commit Suicide? Beautiful Hypotheses and Ugly Facts. Oxford University Press: New 
York 1996, 3–26. Chitty cites evidence that scenes in the Disney film White Wilderness (1958) apparently 
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tinguish oneself from one’s bodily life are uniquely human, are clearly even harder to resolve: 
the issue of whether human beings are free in this way is scientifically and theologically 
contentious, and it is hard to know what it might mean for humans to distinguish themselves 
from their bodily lives, let alone determine that this was a uniquely human capacity. Beyond 
this accuracy question, however, the suicide example is interesting in clarifying the adequacy 
issue. If it could be shown that suicide was a uniquely human act, it is not clear how this 
observation should function in Bonhoeffer’s argument. If the supposed unique human ability to 
experience joy supports the case that joy in bodily life should be affirmed, why should not the 
supposed unique human ability to commit suicide support the case that suicide should be 
affirmed? A similar argument could be made in favour of sin given that it seems Bonhoeffer 
believes this also to be uniquely human.16 This example shows that something more than the 
identification of a unique human characteristic is required for an adequate argument: it must 
also be shown that this characteristic is deserving of affirmation. If this is the case, however, it 
is not clear why in addition to being deserving of affirmation it should also be necessary to 
show that a characteristic is unique to human beings. Parental care for young, for example, is 
not less deserving of affirmation because it is not unique to human beings. The designation of a 
characteristic as uniquely human is therefore shown to be beside the point whether the 
designation is accurate or not. 
The third example of this form of argument in the Ethics occurs in introducing 
Bonhoeffer’s ethics of reproduction. Here he states: 
Human beings, in contrast to animals, are not controlled by a dark, unconscious drive to 
preserve the species in general; rather, this drive toward reproduction appears as the 
conscious will to have a child of one’s own. Accordingly, human reproduction is not simply 
necessary for the sake of the species but is a personal decision. Be- 
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cause of this, a human being as a person has the right to personal choice of a marriage 
partner.17 
It is not hard to be sympathetic to Bonhoeffer’s aim in opposing Nazi marriage laws here, but it 
is not at all clear that his argument is sound. Again, there is strong reliance on a supposed 
human/non-human distinction: non-human animals reproduce under compulsion from a “dark, 
unconscious drive to preserve the species” whereas human reproduction is motivated by 
conscious will. This observation is implausible both in denying other animals any conscious 
will in relation to reproduction, which relegates them to Cartesian instinct-machines,18 and also 
                                                                                                                                                  
showing lemming mass suicide were faked by the crew throwing lemmings from a cliff into a river (210, n. 
17). 
16 This is suggested by his fictional passage about the innocence of a mother bird pushing a chick from the nest 
(Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Fiction From Tegel Prison. DBWE 7. Fortress: Minneapolis 2000, 93-96 (97-99)). 
17
 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Ethics. DBWE 6, 203 (199f). 
18
 See René Descartes, Discourse on Method and Other Writings. Trans. Frank Edmund Sutcliffe. Penguin: 
Harmondsworth 1968, 74f. 
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in idealizing human decisions concerning reproduction as rational and conscious, which brings 
to mind Augustine’s unfortunate ideal of entirely rational sexual intercourse.19 Beyond this 
question of accuracy, the question of argumentative adequacy remains: it is unclear why 
identifying a conscious will to reproduce uniquely with human beings should support 
Bonhoeffer’s case here. If some element of a conscious will to reproduce were demonstrable in 
dolphins, for example, it is hard to see how this would weaken the case for opposing Nazi 
racism in relation to marriage law. The question of consequence is also important here given 
the unhappy history of experiments conducted on other animals in the belief that they were 
machines incapable of feeling pain.20 
While the Ethics is the only work in which Bonhoeffer deploys observations about 
supposedly unique human characteristics in support of ethical  
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arguments, he often uses such observations elsewhere in discussing other aspects of human life. 
In Sanctorum Communio he sees more in common between humans and other animals than he 
did later in the Ethics, stating that they share “the drives of imitation, subordination, sociability, 
and especially of hunger and sexuality”.21 However, his concession of this commonality is in 
the context of his rejection of the view that it is instincts that lead to human social formation: in 
similar terms to those used in the Ethics in relation to reproduction, he claims that “Human 
community per se is only present where conscious human spirit is at work, that is, where 
community rests upon purposeful acts of will”.22 In making this argument, Bonhoeffer seems to 
be opposing the position of Albert Espinas, who argued in his 1878 work Des sociétés 
animales for a unified sociology applicable both to humans and other animals.23 A passage in 
the dissertation omitted from the published version references the 1879 German translation of 
Espinas’s work and recognizes the highly developed sociality of other animals.24 While human 
uniqueness is not used in support of an ethical argument here, Bonhoeffer seems to believe it 
                                                
19
 Augustine, The City of God against the Pagans. Trans. R. W. Dyson. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
1998, 14.19. Gilbert Meilander argues that Augustine is more subtle than this text suggests: see Gilbert 
Meilander, ‘Sweet Necessities: Food, Sex, and Saint Augustine’, 1 Journal of Religious Ethics (29:1) 2001, 
3–18. 
20
 Leonora Cohen Rosenfield documents the way Cartesian vivisectionists mocked those who pitied the animals 
subject to their cruel experiments: Leonara Cohen Rosenfield, From Beast-Machine to Man-Machine. Oxford 
University Press: New York 1941, 54. Descartes himself probably did not take the extreme view of some of his 
followers that other animals do not feel pain, however: see John Cottingham, ‘'A Brute to the Brutes?' 
Descartes' Treatment of Animals’, in: Philosophy (53) 1978, 551–561 and Peter Harrison, ‘Descartes on 
Animals’, in: The Philosophical Quarterly (42:167) 1992, 219–227. 
21
 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Sanctorum Communio. A Theological Study of the Sociology of the Church. DBWE 1. 
Fortress: Minneapolis 1998, 81 (51). 
22
 Ibid., 81 (51). 
23 Alfred Espinas, Des Sociétés Animales. Librairie Germer Ballière: Paris 1878. For a discussion of Espinas’s 
work, see John I. Brooks, The Eclectic Legacy: Academic Philosophy and the Human Science. Associated 
University Presses: Cranbury, NJ 1998, 97–133. 
24
 The passage is included by the editors of the collected works in a footnote: Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Sanctorum 
Communio. DBWE 1, 80f (51), n. 63. 
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significant for his argument about human society that humans are unique in being capable of 
conscious acts of will.25 
Elsewhere Bonhoeffer hints at other unique human features. In a 1928 sermon he 
quotes Augustine’s observation of our hearts being restless until they find their rest in God, and 
states that “Restlessness is the characteristic feature distinguishing human beings from 
animals” pointing them towards the eternal.26 Other than human animals also feature frequently 
in his fic- 
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tion: in the opening scene of a play written in Tegel Prison a grandmother tells “Little Brother” 
a story of a deer being shot by a hunter, and speculates that unlike humans animals may not fear 
death.27 In a similar scene from a novel a grandmother tells “Little Brother” that he should not 
judge a mother bird for pushing a weak baby bird from the nest, because in the animal world, 
unlike the human, only the strong can survive and animals are innocent, knowing no other way 
to live.28 
2. Incarnate human uniqueness 
There is one doctrinal theme Bonhoeffer takes up in the Ethics and beyond29 that appears to 
have much better theological grounding than these diverse observations about 
human/non-human differences: 
Only because God became human it is possible to know and not despise real human beings. 
Real human beings may live before God, and we may let these real people live beside us 
and before God without either despising or idolizing them. This is not because of the real 
human being’s inherent value, but because God has loved and taken on the real human 
being. The reason for God’s love for human beings does not reside in them, but only in God. 
Our living as real human beings, and loving the real people next to us is, again, grounded 
only in God’s becoming human, in the unfathomable love of God for us human beings.30 
Here Bonhoeffer provides a justification for human uniqueness based in nothing less than the 
incarnation of God in Christ. The appeal has become a popular theological commonplace: in 
becoming human, it is often said,  
 
                                                
25
 Obviously, Bonhoeffer is far from unique among sociologists in not seeing beyond the disciplinary boundary, 
which has only recently being challenged (see, for example, David Nibert, ‘Humans and Other Animals: 
Sociology’s Moral and Intellectual Challenge’, in: 3 International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy 
(23:3) 2003, 4–25. 
26
 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Barcelona, Berlin, Amerika, 1928–1931. DBWE 10. Fortress: Minneapolis 2008, 481 
(456). 
27 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Fiction From Tegel Prison. DBWE 7, 27 (22). 
28
 Ibid., 95 (98). 
29
 In addition to the passage cited, see, for example, Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Sanctorum Communio. DBWE 1, 225 
(224), 262–3 (262); Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Christology, trans. John Bowden. Collins: London 1966, 50. 
30 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Ethics. DBWE 6, 87 (74). 
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God established the unique value of human life and therefore grounds for respect for human 
persons. This mode of argument has a key difficulty, however, because it depends on 
identifying the significance of God’s incarnation in Christ in a very particular way. This can be 
seen at its clearest in relation to this altered version of the passage, in which all references to 
human beings are restricted to males: 
 Only because God became a male human being it is possible to know and not despise male 
human beings. Male human beings may live before God, and we may let these real males 
live beside us and before God without either despising or idolizing them. This is not 
because of the male’s inherent value, but because God has loved and taken on the male 
human being. The reason for God’s love for male human beings does not reside in them, but 
only in God. Our living as male human beings, and loving the male people next to us is, 
again, grounded only in God’s becoming male, in the unfathomable love of God for us 
males. 
Obviously, this altered version presents a very different interpretation of the incarnation, an 
interpretation highly objectionable in its gender-exclusivity. Unfortunately the force of the 
position expressed here is not wholly unfamiliar in the Christian tradition, but it has been 
unmasked and challenged successfully by feminist critiques of Christian doctrine. 31  The 
theological mistake here concerns the specificity with which the significance of the incarnation 
is specified. It is not false to say that God became in Christ a male human being, just as it is not 
false to say that God became a Jewish human being, or a 1
st
 century AD human being, or a 
Palestinian human being: the error is to think that the significance of the incarnation of God in 
Christ should be limited by particularities of gender, religion, time or geography. The problem 
with the appeal by Bonhoeffer and countless others to ground appeals to human uniqueness in 
the incarnation is that appeals of this kind could just as well be deployed to ground a unique 
and privileged status  
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before God of male, Jewish, Palestinian, or 1
st
 century human beings.32 In fact, biblical texts 
give us good reason to think that the significance of the incarnation is cosmic in scope, rather 
than merely human: Paul’s letters, for example, claim that all things are reconciled in Christ 
through the cross (Col,1.13–20), that all things are gathered up by God in Christ (Eph. 1,9–10) 
and that through the Spirit the whole creation will be released from bondage to enjoy the 
freedom of God’s children (Rom. 8,21). In the light of these texts the fullest expression of 
God’s incarnation in Christ is to say that God became a creature or that God took on creation. 
                                                
31
 See, for example, Rosemary Radford Ruether’s chapter ‘Christology: Can a Male Savior Save Women?’, in: 
Rosemary Radford Ruether, Sexism and God-Talk: Towards a Feminist Theology. SCM: London 2002, 
116–138. 
32
 This is not to deny that Christians should recognize Jewish human beings to enjoy a particular status before God, 
but this status is based in their election by God, rather than the religious particularity of the incarnation. Neither 
is it to deny that the Palestinian people have a particular status before God, but this status is similarly not 
dependent on the geographical particularity of the incarnation. 
Clough Interpreting human life by looking the other way 8 
To consider the incarnation a basis for the valuation of human beings uniquely among God’s 
creatures is therefore to make the same mistake evident in the altered version of the Bonhoeffer 
passage above: it errs by interpreting the particularity of the incarnation as the limits of its 
significance.33 
A surprising passage in Bonhoeffer’s Christology suggests that he might not object to 
such an extension of the doctrine of the incarnation. After considering the role of Christ as the 
“Centre of Human Existence” and the “Centre of History” he considers “Christ as the Mediator 
between God and Nature”,34 noting that little attention has previously been paid by Protes- 
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tant theologians to this question. He continues by picturing Christ as not taking on humanness, 
but creatureliness: 
Christ is the new creature. He thus shows all other creatures to be old creatures. Nature 
stands under the curse which God has laid on Adam’s ground. It was originally the created 
Word of God, proclaiming the Word freely. As fallen creation, however, it is now dumb, in 
thrall under the guilt of men. Like history, nature suffers from the loss of its meaning and 
freedom. It longs for a new freedom. Nature is not reconciled, like man and history, but it is 
redeemed for a new freedom. Its catastrophes are the dull will to make itself free, to prove 
its power over men and to be a new creature in its own right, to create itself anew.35 
Nature finds redemption in Christ, signified in the sacraments, where elements of the old 
creation become elements of the new. In the sacrament, “Christ is the mediator between nature 
and God, and stands for all creatures before God”.36 
3. Created human uniqueness 
In Creation and Fall, Bonhoeffer offers a different theological basis for the uniqueness of 
humanity. After noting the fundamental distinction between creator and creature,37 a central 
focus is on the distinctiveness of the human creature. In his commentary on the creation of 
human beings in Genesis 1,26–7 he first notes the discontinuity with the creation of other 
creatures: the Hebrew plural (‘Let us make’) shows the significance of the new creation of 
                                                
33
 Stephen Webb puts the same point this way: ‘The crucial difference that needs to be made is between the form 
(which is necessarily limited) and the range of efficacy (which is unlimited) of the incarnation’ and also points 
to the comparison with the position of women and Gentiles: Stephen H. Webb, On God and Dogs: A Christian 
Theology of Compassion for Animals. Oxford University Press: New York and Oxford 1998, 170. See also my 
discussion of this in David Clough, ‘All God's Creatures: Reading Genesis on Human and Non-Human 
Animals’, in: Reading Genesis After Darwin, Stephen Barton, and David Wilkinson (eds.). Oxford University 
Press: Oxford (forthcoming). Andrew Linzey criticizes Karl Barth for a human-exclusivist interpretation of the 
incarnation: see Andrew Linzey, Animal Theology. SCM Press: London 1994, 9–12; Andrew Linzey, 
‘Introduction: Is Christianity Irredeemably Speciesist?’, in: Animals on the Agenda: Questions About Animals 
for Theology and Ethics, Andrew Linzey, and Dorothy Yamamoto (eds.). SCM Press: London 1998, xv–xvi. 
34 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Christology, trans. John Bowden. Collins: London 1966, 61–67. 
35
 Ibid., 66f. 
36
 Ibid., 67. 
37
 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Creation and Fall: A Theological Exposition of Genesis 1–3. DBWE 3. Fortress: 
Minneapolis 1997, 32 (31). 
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human beings. This special dignity accorded to humankind is confirmed in that they are not 
called forth from the earth like other creatures, but instead “taken up into God’s own planning”, 
signifying that “something  
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altogether original is about to happen” in the event of their creation.38 The creation of human 
beings is God’s ultimate, new work imaging Godself: “There is no transition from somewhere 
else here; here there is new creation.”39 Bonhoeffer comments that this has nothing to do with 
Darwin, and states “We in no way wish to deny humankind’s connection with the animal world 
— on the contrary.” He is anxious, however, to “not lose sight of the peculiar relation between 
humankind and God above and beyond this” and be tempted into dangerous speculations about 
human origins instead of recognizing our identity “as those who live from Christ”.40 
When Bonhoeffer turns to the question of what the image of God consists in, his 
answer is plain and direct: it “means that humankind is like the Creator in that it is free”.41 
Freedom, then, is the respect in which human beings image God in the world. For Bonhoeffer it 
is important, however, to state immediately that the freedom human beings possess is “not a 
quality a human being has; it is not an ability, a capacity”.42 Freedom “is a relation between two 
persons” so being “free means ‘being-free-for-the-other’, because I am bound to the other. 
Only by being in relation with the other am I free”43 Bonhoeffer sees this as the crucial 
distinction between human beings and other creatures: “Humankind differs from the other 
creatures in that God is in humankind as the very image of God”.44 He comments that this is 
what the “older dogmatic theologians” meant when they spoke of the Trinity inhering in Adam. 
Therefore the image of God does not establish a similarity of being between humanity and 
God: the image is no analogia entis but an analogia relationis and freedom is given in this 
relationship.45 There is, therefore, a marked difference between how this gift of freedom is 
exercised in relation to other human beings and in relation to the rest of the world: “whereas the 
freedom of human beings over against one another consisted in being free for one another, 
humankind’s freedom over against  
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the rest of the created world is to be free from it. That means that humankind is its lord; 
humankind has command over it, rules it.”46 Again, Bonhoeffer notes that this does not mean 
we are not tied to the rest of the world: “On the contrary, in my whole being, in my 
creatureliness, I belong wholly to this world; it bears me, nurtures me, holds me.” But we are 
                                                
38 Ibid., 61 (57). 
39
 Ibid., 62 (57). 
40
 Ibid., 62 (58). 
41
 Ibid., 62 (58). 
42 Ibid., 62f (58). 
43
 Ibid., 63 (59). 
44
 Ibid., 63f (59). 
45
 Ibid., 64f (60f). 
46 Ibid., 66 (61). 
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bound to it as a lord is bound to his servant: “I am to rule, and the more I master it, the more it 
is my earth”.47 In the following paragraph Bonhoeffer concedes that we do not experience our 
existence as this kind of ruling: instead “the world rules humankind” and “humankind is a 
prisoner, a slave, of the world, and its dominion is an illusion”. But the cause of this lack of rule 
is because we fail to acknowledge the world as God’s: if we recognized the demand on us to 
serve God, and stopped our sentimental “shying away from exercising dominion over the 
earth” we would enjoy our dominion as God intended.48 
Bonhoeffer’s commentary on Genesis chapter two develops his view of the 
distinctiveness of beings further. He notes that the story of God forming human beings from 
the earth speaks more directly of the earthly origins of humankind than Darwin or Feuerbach: 
“Humankind is derived from a piece of earth. […] The ‘earth is its mother’; it comes out of her 
womb.”49 But what makes human beings distinctive in the second creation narrative is God’s 
enlivening breath, which Bonhoeffer identifies with the Holy Spirit: “The human body differs 
from all non-human bodies in that it is the form in which the spirit of God exists on earth, just 
as it is altogether identical with all other life in being earth-like.”50 While the other animals 
have the same kind of bodies as Adam and are siblings to Adam, Adam is alone because “What 
has come out of the ground remains alien to human kind.”51 After the fateful choice of Eve and 
Adam to disobey God, Bonhoeffer notes the consequence of “the destruction and dividedness 
of the original relation between humankind and nature”.52 The other creatures rise up against 
the one who has become ‘sicut deus’ (like God): they exclude and withdraw from  
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human beings, growing “mute, enigmatic and unfruitful”.53 But they also share in the evil 
consequences of the human decision: 
With the fall of humankind […] they themselves, as creatures made subject to humankind, 
fall into dividedness as well; they become nature without a master and thus in rebellion and 
despair, nature under the curse, accursed ground. That is our earth. Cursed, it is cast out of 
the glory of its created state, out of the unambiguous immediacy of its speech and praise of 
the Creator into the ambiguity of utter strangeness and enigma. The trees and the animals, 
which once immediately represented God’s word as the Creator, now in often grotesque 
ways point instead as though to the incomprehensibility and arbitrariness of a despot who is 
hidden in darkness.54 
After the Fall, human beings remain lord of the world, but now their rule is solitary and 
despotic, and they reign over the “mute, violated, silenced, dead” world of their own egos.55 
Alongside this dark vision, however, Bonhoeffer also offers a sign of hope for the future of 
                                                
47 Ibid., 66 (62). 
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 Ibid., 67 (62f). 
49
 Ibid., 76 (71). 
50
 Ibid., 78f (73). 
51 Ibid., 97 (90). 
52
 Ibid., 133 (125). 
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 Ibid., 134 (125f). 
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 Ibid., 134 (125–6). 
55 Ibid., 142 (132). 
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creation beyond what is visible to Adam: “How could Adam hear announced already in the 
peace of death, and returning to mother earth, the peace that God wishes once more to conclude 
with the earth, the peace that God wishes to establish over a new and blessed earth in the world 
of the resurrection?”56 
Bonhoeffer’s initial emphasis in Creation and Fall on the absolute distinction 
between creator and creature seems to promise much in the appreciation of the solidarity 
between humans and other animals he affirms: once we appreciate the incomparable difference 
between God and God’s creation, recognizing the commonality of all things created is 
inescapable. Bonhoeffer is also concerned, however, to retain an adequate appreciation of the 
unique relationship between God and human beings, and identifies freedom in relationship as 
what is particular to humanity in imaging God on earth. The choice of freedom as the 
distinguishing feature between human beings and other creatures returns us to his discussion of 
suicide in the 
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Ethics and provokes the same question of whether Bonhoeffer is accurate in his apparent belief 
that human beings are the only creatures that enjoy freedom in relationship. This question can 
be pressed in at least three areas. Exegetically, there is no evidence in the Genesis chapters that 
freedom is what characterizes the image of God, and so we must add this to the long list of 
favourite capacities and attributes that theologians have posited to fill out the biblical silence 
on the issue.57 Theologically, if freedom is an attribute of relationships, it is not immediately 
clear why God could not grace other creatures with such a relationship too, especially as Paul 
in Romans 8,21 anticipates the whole of creation enjoying the freedom of the children of God. 
If one objects to this that other creatures do not have the capacity for this kind of relationship, 
we will need to refer to debates about intelligence, rationality and language, in relation to each 
of which it is hard to argue a clear discontinuity between human abilities and the abilities of 
other intelligent creatures.58 Empirically, of course, it is not possible to prove either that human 
actions are free or that the actions of non-human creatures are not. Clearly, Bonhoeffer prizes 
freedom highly and sees an analogy between the human exercise of freedom and the emphasis 
he places on God’s free actions, but his argument that this is how we should understand the 
image of God is unpersuasive. His suggestion that the image of God in creation might be 
relational is much more interesting: it has exegetical foundation in the corporate invitation of 
human beings into the life of God he notes, and fits well with the trinitarian aspects of God’s 
indwelling of human beings to which he draws attention. It also does not depend on 
                                                
56
 Ibid., 136 (127). 
57
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establishing a discontinuity between God’s relationships with different creatures: relationality 
between creatures and their God might receive particular  
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expression in human beings, but we could say that God’s relationships with other creatures also 
represent an imaging of the divine within creation.59 
 
In a 1928 letter to Walter Dreß, Bonhoeffer recounts an episode suggesting that under 
pressure he might be prepared to countenance this kind of extension to the analogia relationis 
beyond the boundaries of the human. He confesses that he was at a loss to know how to reply to 
a tearful boy whose dog had died and who asked Bonhoeffer if he would see his dog again in 
heaven. Bonhoeffer decides to respond: “Look, God created human beings and also animals, 
and I’m sure he also loves animals. And I believe that with God it is such that all who loved 
each other on earth — genuinely loved each other — will remain together with God, for to love 
is part of God. Just how that happens, though, we admittedly don’t know.”60 
The interpretation Bonhoeffer makes of the different way human freedom plays out in 
relation to other human beings and non-human creatures is a second and more problematic 
element in his interpretation of the opening chapters of Genesis. We are to be free for 
relationships with other human beings, but free from the rest of the creaturely realm.61 This 
arises from God giving human beings dominion over other creatures, which for Bonhoeffer 
separates and distinguishes humanity from all other parts of creation. As we have seen, 
Bonhoeffer has a strong sense of our earthly origins and dependence on the rest of the 
creaturely world, but his high — almost feudal — view of the task of ruling that God has given 
humanity means that relationships with other creatures belong in a fundamentally distinct 
category from relationships with other human beings. Again, this requires interrogation. In the 
first place, the kind of ruling Bonhoeffer describes when he reaches the human/non-human 
categories are a marked departure from the kind of authority he attributes to God in relation to 
creation. In the act of creation “the Creator denies [the Creator’s own self]” (square brackets 
part of the quotation) in granting “form to what is created and […] exist- 
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ence before the Creator”.62 Bonhoeffer’s account of how God’s sovereignty works emphasizes 
its gracious, enabling and self-giving character. He also repeatedly draws attention to the need 
to interpret Genesis christologically. If human beings are to image God in the exercise of their 
God-given authority, it would seem that the mode of this authority should be analogous to that 
self-giving mode shown by God in Christ, especially since they are creatures in authority over 
                                                
59 Aquinas suggests different parts of creation could image God in different degrees (Thomas Aquinas, Summa 
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other creatures. 63  If Bonhoeffer was right that a relationship of authority mandated a 
discontinuity between rulers and subjects, it would seems that human political institutions 
would require similar categorizations of the basic differences between rulers and subjects, 
which he might accept but we should not. Perhaps we should see human authority over other 
creatures as being given responsibility by God to play a particular role for which human beings 
are best suited. Thinking in this direction would be a long way, however, from Bonhoeffer’s 
anxiety about whether we are sufficiently dominant over the world in obedience to God’s 
command, and might well prompt concern from the opposite direction. 
4. Beyond human uniqueness 
While most of the material in the preceding sections has exhibited Bonhoeffer’s attempts to 
render human uniqueness, other elements in his thought emphasize solidarity between humans 
and other animals. We have already noted the drives he claims human and non-human animals 
share in Sanctorum Communio,64 the commonality between all creatures established by the 
doctrine of creation in Creation and Fall,65 the account of Christ taking on creatureliness in 
Christology66 and the possibility of non-human participation in the analogia relationis.67 The 
commonality Bonhoeffer re- 
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cognizes between humans and other animals is also evident when he comments on Jesus’ 
teaching on emulating birds and lilies: they are examples for disciples who do not collect the 
goods of the world but “praise their creator, not by their industry, their work, their worry, but 
by receiving daily and simply the gifts God gives”.68
 
Bonhoeffer saw death as part of the shared 
lot of all God’s creatures, using this observation to open children’s homilies on Remembrance 
Day in two successive years.69
 
In addition to his theological and philosophical thought concerning the boundary 
between human and non-human animals, it is also instructive to consider Bonhoeffer’s attitude 
towards the other animals he encountered. Gerhard Leibholz’s “Memoir” recalls that 
Bonhoffer “was as open as any man can be to all the things which make life beautiful […] He 
loved the mountains, the flowers, the animals — the greatest and simplest things in life”.70 This 
is echoed in Bonhoeffer’s attitude to hunting, reported to Maria von Wedemeyer in 1943: “I 
much enjoy sitting in a blind or on the edge of a forest at dusk, waiting to watch — with a 
pounding heart — for the animals to emerge. But I’ve never felt the slightest inclination to 
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shoot them. Why should I, when it’s not necessary?”71 It is also clear in a 1943 letter from 
Tegel prison to his parents: 
A little while ago a tomtit had its nest with its ten little ones in a recess in the yard here. I 
enjoyed going to look at it every day until some cruel fellow went and destroyed the lot and 
left some of the tomtits lying on the ground, dead; I can’t understand it. When I walk in the 
yard I get a great deal of pleasure from a small ant-hill and from the bees in the lime-trees. 
I sometimes think of the story of Peter Bamm, who was on a lovely island where he met all 
kinds of people, good and bad. He dreamt in a nightmare that a bomb might come and 
destroy everything, and the first thing that occurred to him was what a pity it would be for 
the butterflies! Prison life brings  
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home to one how nature carries on uninterruptibly in its quiet, open life, and it gives one 
quite a special — perhaps a sentimental — attitude towards animals and plant life, except 
that my attitude towards the flies in my cell remains very unsentimental.72 
His poem “Who Am I” expresses a similar empathy in picturing himself  
restless and longing and sick, like a bird in a cage 
struggling for breath, as though hands were compressing my throat, 
yearning for colours, for flowers, for the voices of birds73 
Beyond these recognitions of what human and non-human animals share, it is significant to 
note a point in his work when Bonhoeffer leaves space open for the inclusion of creation 
beyond the human. In his discussion of eschatology in Sanctorum Communio he states that 
while Christian eschatology “is essentially eschatology of the church-community” there is also 
a problem of “the eschatology of culture and nature” that he leaves unaddressed.74 
5. Rethinking human uniqueness 
The preceding sections have assessed trajectories in Bonhoeffer’s thought where he seeks to 
provide a hermeneutic human life by looking the other way — reflecting on the boundary 
between human and non-human life through observing differences between human beings and 
other animals, considering the doctrine of the incarnation and interpretation of the first chapters 
of Genesis — as well as surveying elements in his thought that  
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present openings to other ways of thinking about human and non-human animals. Approaching 
Bonhoeffer’s thought from this angle leads to two concluding points, one negative and one 
positive. 
The negative point is that it is clear that Bonhoeffer’s use of observations concerning 
supposedly unique human characteristics to support ethical arguments is misguided and 
unfruitful. The first difficulty with this mode of argument is that it fails to respect the 
constraints Bonhoeffer sets himself of grounding Christian ethics in the Gospel rather than in 
philosophical speculation or non-theological accounts of the natural. The second difficulty 
concerns the accuracy of Bonhoeffer’s observations of differences in characteristics between 
human beings and other animals, which can be seen to be dubious at every point. Even if these 
objections could be overcome, however, the arguments would fail at the third and much 
broader hurdle that whether or not a characteristic is uniquely human is irrelevant to ethics. The 
uniqueness of human possession of a capacity is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition 
for ethical commendation: the example of parental care shown by many kinds of animals 
shows that it is not necessary to show a capacity to be unique to human beings to commend it; 
Bonhoeffer’s view of suicide as uniquely human makes clear that the supposed uniqueness of a 
capacity is not sufficient grounds to recommend it.75 Despite the long pedigree in philosophical 
and theological ethics of ethical argument based on supposed human/non-human differences 
we must therefore recognize that such differences are irrelevant to questions concerning how 
human beings should behave, and reject the arguments of this kind offered by Bonhoeffer in 
common with many others.76 
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The rejection of ethical argument based on supposed unique human characteristics 
should alert us to the danger of similarly problematic argumentation concerning 
human/non-human difference in other areas of theology. Consideration of Bonhoeffer’s 
doctrine of the  
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incarnation indicated that restricting the significance of the incarnation to the single species of 
homo sapiens was structurally similar to restricting its significance to male human beings, and 
no more defensible. Similarly, Bonhoeffer’s interpretation of the imago Dei in terms of the 
analogia relationis cannot be coherently rendered so as to include only human beings. 
Attending with rigour to the human/non-human boundary in a theological context, in 
Bonhoeffer’s work as elsewhere, reveals deficiencies in arguments that exclude non-human 
creatures from consideration. 
It is important to note that as well as leading to bad ethics and bad theology, 
inadequate reasoning about the differences between humans and other animals has bad 
consequences for other animals. Judging on inadequate evidence that homo sapiens is the only 
species that thinks, uses language, enjoys freedom, rises above instinct, and so on, means all 
other animals are classified as unthinking and uncommunicative slaves to their instinctual 
drives. Such attribution is grossly inaccurate according to modern research on animal 
capabilities and also leads to inadequate respect for the welfare of other animals, providing a 
third reason to improve theological thinking in this area. 
The requirement to improve theological thinking in this area leads to the positive 
conclusion arising from this consideration of Bonhoeffer’s thought: in the project of 
developing theological thinking that attends adequately to commonality and difference 
between humans and other animals, Bonhoeffer’s thought offers considerable resources. His 
relational interpretation of the image of God suggests the possibility of recognizing God’s 
image in the world as more than merely human. Similarly, his depiction of Christ as first 
creature and mediator between God and nature is a significant indication towards a way of 
avoiding interpretations of the doctrine of the  
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incarnation that restrict its significance to the human. Taken together with his speculation 
about the place of dogs in the life beyond, Bonhoeffer’s thought therefore suggests ways of 
overcoming inappropriate differentiation between human and non-human creatures in each of 
the spheres of creation, reconciliation and redemption. While other than human animals were 
rarely the focus of Bonhoeffer’s thought, he was sufficiently attentive to the lives of the 
creatures about him that the trajectory of his thought is not closed to interpreting human life in 
solidarity with as well as distinction from other animals. 
 
Clough Interpreting human life by looking the other way 17 
References 
 
Aquinas, Thomas, Summa Theologica, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province. 
Blackfriars: London 1963. 
Aristotle, The Ethics of Aristotle: The Nicomachean Ethics, ed. Hugh Tredennick, trans. J. A. 
K. Thompson. Penguin Revised edition: Harmondsworth, Middlesex 1976. 
Augustine, The City of God against the Pagans, trans. R. W. Dyson. Cambridge University 
Press: Cambridge 1998. 
Barth, Karl, Church Dogmatics, vol. III/2, ed. G. W. Bromiley and T. F. Torrance. T. & T. 
Clark: Edinburgh 1960. 
Bekoff, Marc, Minding Animals: Awareness, Emotions, and Heart. Oxford University Press: 
New York 2002. 
_____, Animal Passions and Beastly Virtues: Reflections on Redecorating Nature. Temple 
University Press: Philadelphia 2006. 
Bonhoeffer, Dietrich, Barcelona, Berlin, Amerika, 1928–1931. DBWE 10. Fortress: 
Minneapolis 2008. 
_____, Christology, trans. John Bowden. Collins: London 1966. 
_____, Creation and Fall: A Theological Exposition of Genesis 1–3.DBWE 3. Fortress: 
Minneapolis 1997. 
_____, DBW, ed. Eberhard Bethge. Chr. Kaiser Verlag: Munich 1986. 
_____, Discipleship. DBWE 4. Fortress: Minneapolis 2001. 
_____, Ethics. Dietrich Bonhoeffer Works, DBWE 6. Fortress: Minneapolis 2005. 
_____, Fiction From Tegel Prison. DBWE 7. Fortress: Minneapolis  
_____, LPP. SCM: London 1953. 
_____, Sanctorum Communio: A Theological Study of the Sociology of the Church. Dietrich 
Bonhoeffer Works, DBWE 1. 2000. 
_____, The Cost of Discipleship, trans. R. H. Fuller. SCM: London 2001. 
Brooks, John I., The Eclectic Legacy: Academic Philosophy and the Human Science. 
Associated University Presses: Cranbury, NJ 1998. 
Chitty, Dennis, Do Lemmings Commit Suicide? Beautiful Hypotheses and Ugly Facts. Oxford 
University Press: New York 1996. 
 
[top of page 73] 
Clough, David, ‘All God's Creatures: Reading Genesis on Human and Non-Human Animals’, 
in: Reading Genesis After Darwin, Stephen Barton, and David Wilkinson (eds.). Oxford 
University Press: Oxford (forthcoming). 
_____, ‘The Anxiety of the Human Animal: Martin Luther on Non-Human Animals and 
Human Animality’, in: Creaturely Theology: On God, Humans and Other Animals, Celia 
Deane-Drummond, and David Clough (eds.). SCM: London 2009, 41–60. 
Cohen Rosenfield, Leonara, From Beast-Machine to Man-Machine. Oxford University Press: 
New York 1941. 
Cottingham, John, ‘'A Brute to the Brutes?' Descartes' Treatment of Animals’, in: Philosophy 
(53) 1978, 551–61. 
Crawley, J. N., M. E. Sutton, and D. Pickar, ‘Animal Models of Self-Destructive Behavior and 
Suicide’, Psychiatric Clinics of North America 8:2 (1985), 299-310. 
Clough Interpreting human life by looking the other way 18 
de Waal, Frans, Good Natured: The Origins of Right and Wrong in Humans and Other Animals. 
Harvard University Press: Cambridge, MA 1996. 
Derrida, Jacques and Wills, David, ‘The Animal That Therefore I Am (More to Follow)’, in: 
Critical Inquiry (28:2) 2002, 369-418. 
Descartes, René, Discourse on Method and Other Writings, trans. Frank Edmund Sutcliffe. 
Penguin: Harmondsworth 1968. 
Dupré, John, Humans and Other Animals. Clarendon: Oxford 2002. 
Espinas, Alfred, Des Sociétés Animales. Librairie Germer Ballière: Paris 1878. 
Griffin, Donald R., Animal Minds. University of Chicago Press: Chicago 1992. 
Harrison, Peter, ‘Descartes on Animals’, in: The Philosophical Quarterly (42:167) 1992, 
219–27. 
Jonsen, Albert R., The Birth of Bioethics. OUP: New York 1998. 
King, James E., and Landau, Virginia I., ‘Can Chimpanzee (Pan Troglodytes) Happiness be 
Estimated By Human Raters?’, in: Journal of Research in Personality (37:1) 2003, 1–15. 
Linzey, Andrew, Animal Theology. SCM Press: London 1994. 
_____, ‘Introduction: Is Christianity Irredeemably Speciesist?’, in: Animals on the Agenda: 
Questions About Animals for Theology and Ethics, Andrew Linzey, and Dorothy 
Yamamoto (eds.). SCM Press: London 1998, ix–xx. 
McMillan, Franklin D., ‘Do Animals Experience True Happiness?’, in: Mental Health and 
Well-Being in Animals, Franklin D. McMillan (ed.). Oxford: Blackwell 2005, 221–34. 
Meilander, Gilbert, ‘Sweet Necessities: Food, Sex, and Saint Augustine’, in: Journal of 
Religious Ethics (29:1) 2001, 3–18. 
Nibert, David, ‘Humans and Other Animals: Sociology’s Moral and Intellectual Challenge’, 
in: 3 International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy (23:3) 2003, 4–25. 
Plato, Plato in Twelve Volumes, vol. 12, trans. Harold N. Fowler. Harvard University Press, 
William Heinemann Ltd: Cambridge, MA and London 1921. 
Potter, Van Rensselaer, Bioethics: Bridge to the Future. Prentice Hall: Englewood Cliffs 1971. 
Preti, Antonio, ‘Suicide Among Animals: A Review of Evidence’, in: Psychological Reports 
(101) 2007, 831-48. 
 
[top of page 74] 
Radford Ruether, Rosemary, Sexism and God-Talk: Towards a Feminist Theology,. SCM: 
London 2002. 
Renehan, Robert, ‘The Greek Anthropocentric View of Man’, in: Harvard Studies in Classical 
Philology (85) 1981, 239–59. 
Ristau, Carolyn A. (ed.), Cognitive Ethology: The Minds of Other Animals. Lawrence Erlbaum 
Associates: Hillsdale, NJ 1991. 
Rollin, Bernard E., ‘Animal Happiness: A Philsophical View’, in: Mental Health and 
Well-Being in Animals, Franklin D. McMillan (ed.). Blackwell: Oxford 2005. 235–41. 
Sorabji, Richard, Animal Minds and Human Morals: The Origins of the Western Debate. 
Cornell University Press: Ithaca, NY 1993. 
Steeves, H. Peter, ‘The Familiar Other and Feral Selves: Life At the Human/Animal Boundary’, 
in: The Animal-Human Boundary: Historical Perspectives, Angela N. H. Creager, and 
William Chester Jordan (eds.). University of Rochester Press: Rochester, NY 2002, 
228–64. 
Clough Interpreting human life by looking the other way 19 
Webb, Stephen H., On God and Dogs: A Christian Theology of Compassion for Animals. 
Oxford University Press: New York and Oxford 1998. 
Wenham, Gordon J., Genesis. Word Bible Commentary. Word: Waco 1994. 
Winick, Charles, The Dictionary of Anthropology. Philosophical Library: New York 1956. 
